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MIND-MOVIES: ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP AS APPLIED TO 
WORKS FROM “MIND-READING” NEUROTECHNOLOGY 
THEO AUSTIN BRUTON 
Abstract 
U.S. courts frequently analyze new technology under copyright law. 
Over the years, the courts have applied copyright law to photographic 
cameras, computer programs, digital video recorders, and much more. 
However, a recent breakthrough in the neuroscience community may force 
judges to apply copyright standards in an unorthodox fashion. 
A group of researchers at UC Berkeley devised a process that recon-
structs video sequences from the human brain, essentially creating a movie 
from the person’s mind. As this neurotechnology develops, it is uncertain 
how judges will apply copyright law to content taken directly from the 
brain. Nevertheless, this Article argues that such content meets the origi-
nality standard under U.S. copyright law. Specifically, videos taken from 
the brain are original to the author based on the author’s unique visual 
experiences and unique mental processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recurrent theme in science fiction films is the connection between a human 
brain and a computer. Movies like The Matrix1 and Minority Report2 introduced 
what may be possible for the future of neurotechnology. However, today’s science 
is quickly approaching what was labeled “fiction” just 10 years ago. A professor at 
UC Berkeley developed neurotechnology that reads and records the electronic 
signals of the human brain, and reconstructs the signals to form a video sequence. 
Thus, the final product is essentially a movie copied from a person’s mind—i.e., a 
“mind-movie.” 
Although researchers have only scratched the surface of this technology, the 
potential of mind-movies is immeasurable. One day, people may have the ability to 
store memories on a computer for timeless remembrance; record details of dreams 
for analysis or interpretation; or explore the inner recesses of the human psyche. 
Moreover, people may share subjective mental experiences with others. 
These scenarios may seem fabricated or farfetched, but they are real possi-
bilities. People already capture memories and share visual experiences with the use 
of videography or photography,3 which at one time seemed impossible,4 the mind-
movie just provides a more probing and unprecedented way of capturing similar 
content. Furthermore, researchers currently think about these types of applications 
while developing the neurotechnology for mind-movies.5 
1.  The Matrix is a 1999 American-Australian science fiction action film written and directed by
the Wachowski siblings, and starring Keanu Reeves. It depicts a dystopian future in which reality, as 
perceived by most humans, is actually a simulated reality, called “the Matrix”, created by sentient 
machines. The Matrix, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Matrix (last visited Nov. 13, 
2014). 
2.  Minority Report is a 2002 American science fiction film directed by Steven Spielberg, and
starring Tom Cruise. The film is set in the year 2054, and is known for presenting many different future 
technologies, including several instances of mind-reading technologies. Interestingly, the future tech-
nologies depicted in the film have been labeled prescient. This is likely due to Spielberg consulting with 
a group of experts including urbanists, futurists, and journalists. Spielberg held a three-day “think tank” 
with the experts to create plausible technology for the year 2054. Minority Report, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film) (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
3.  See Lance Ulanoff, Google Glass: I’m Not Winking at You, Just Taking Your Picture,
MASHABLE, (Dec. 18, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/12/18/google-glass-wink-photo-hands-on/; see 
also Luke Westaway, Sony Lifelog Wearable Camera Concept Could Track Your Life, CNET, (Feb. 25, 
2014, 4:00 AM PST) http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13970_7-57619471-78/sony-lifelog-wearable-
camera-concept-could-track-your-life/; Cooper Smith, Facebook Users Are Uploading 350 Million New 
Photos Each Day, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-350-million-photos-each-day-2013–9 (“Facebook revealed in 
a white paper that its users have uploaded more than 250 billion photos, and are uploading 350 million 
new photos each day”). 
4.  A nineteenth century newspaper report stated: “To try to capture fleeting mirror images is not
just an impossible undertaking. . .; the very wish to do such a thing is blasphemous.” WALTER 
BENJAMIN, ONE-WAY STREET AND OTHER WRITINGS 240–241 (1979). 
5.  See The Gallant Lab at UC Berkeley, GALLANTLAB.ORG, http://gallantlab.org/question.html
(follow “Questions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter The Gallant Lab] (“practical 
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The progression of mind-movies is sure to spawn new legal implications 
spanning many different areas of the law.6 Nevertheless, the copyright issues in 
recording a person’s thoughts, memories, and dreams are especially intriguing. 
Specifically, issues of original authorship will likely emerge alongside the neuro-
technology to “enter” someone’s mind. 
This Article identifies the authorship issues of recording the human brain, 
and argues why mind-movies meet the original authorship requirement for copy-
rightability. Part I presents a brief history of authorship and examines the standards 
and contours of original authorship in copyright law. Part II explains the current 
neurotechnology developed at UC Berkeley. Part III uncovers the authorship issues 
associated with the emerging neurotechnology, and argues original authorship in 
mind-movies. 
I. AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. History of Authorship 
Individualistic and creative authorship is a relatively modern concept.7 Prior 
to the 18th century, the author was not singled out or distinguished from all others 
involved in the manufacturing of works.8 For example, a book was deemed the 
final result of equal contributions from the scholar, the writer, the papermaker, the 
type founder, the typesetter, the printer, the proofreader, the publisher, the book-
binder, the gilder, and the brass-worker.9 Thus, authorship was simply considered a 
single step in the overall production process. In fact, authors were not viewed as 
creators, but producers; skilled craftsmen capable of cumulating and organizing 
traditional materials or received ideas.10 If the author produced a work with traces 
brain reading devices would have wide applicability in many other fields, including in communication, 
medical diagnosis and entertainment. . . it could be used to aid in diagnosis of diseases (e.g., stroke, 
dementia); [or] to assess the effects of therapeutic interventions (drug therapy, stem cell therapy)”); 
infra note 69. 
6.  Several people have already begun discussing the legal implications of neurotechnology as
applied to criminal law. See Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 691 (2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 
373 (2012). 
7.  Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the “Author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425, 426 (1984), . 
8.  Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in
Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 192–93 (2008). 
9.  Woodmansee, supra note 7, at 425. 
10.  Id. at 426 (“He was first and foremost a craftsman; that is, he was master of a body of rules,
preserved and handed down to him in rhetoric and poetics, for manipulating traditional materials in 
order to achieve the effects prescribed by the cultivated audience of the court to which he owed both his 
livelihood and social status”). 
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of originality or creativity, such work was not considered inspiration from within, 
but inspiration from above; that is, divine inspiration.11 
In the 18th century, a cultural movement known as Romanticism began to 
blossom in Europe, primarily as a reaction to the Enlightenment.12 Romanticism 
focused on the individual, the imaginative, and transcendental.13 These concepts 
lead to the idea of originality in the arts—the artist, himself, as the creator of 
works.14 An author was no longer considered a producer or a cog in a publication 
machine.15 Instead, Romanticism transformed the author into an “original genius,” 
whose work emanated from his own mind under the impulse of feeling.16 Accord-
ingly, society considered the Romantic author distinctly and personally responsible 
for his creation,17 and expected him to bring unique works into the world.18 
Romanticism soon collided with notions of ownership to form the “modern 
view” of authorship in copyright law.19 In England, authorship was incorporated 
into the first copyright statute—the 1710 Statute of Anne—that recognized the 
exclusive right of authors to control the publication of certain works.20 This statute 
11.  See Id. at 427 (“When a writer managed to rise above the requirements of the occasion to
achieve something higher, much more than craftsmanship seemed to be involved. To explain such 
moments a new concept was introduced: the writer was said to be inspired—by some muse, or even by 
God”). 
12.  See Christopher Casey, “Grecian Grandeurs and the Rude Wasting of Old Time”: Britain, the 
Elgin Marbles, and Post-Revolutionary Hellenism, 3 FOUNDATIONS 31, 33 (2008) (“Romanticism as a 
movement is often considered to have emerged in the mid-eighteenth century as a counterforce to the 
Rationalism of the Enlightenment era.”). There are many ideas and theories regarding the beginnings of 
Romanticism, but such a discussion is outside the scope of this Article. See MICHAEL LOWY & ROBERT 
SAYRE, ROMANTICISM AGAINST THE TIDE OF MODERNITY 17 (2001) (speaking on the French Revolu-
tion: “A transformation of the political order thus became the catalyst for Romanticism.”); ISAIAH 
BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM xiii (2d ed. 2013) (“Romanticism, then, is not simply a reaction 
against Enlightenment, but ‘the greatest transformation of Western consciousness, certainly in our 
time”); EDWARD J. DENT, THE RISE OF ROMANTIC OPERA 1 (1976) (“The historical phenomenon 
known as the Romantic Movement is one which is it very difficult to define. Even if we were to limit its 
scope to literature alone, we should find no clear understanding of when it began or when it ended. . .”). 
13.  Romanticism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/508675/Romanticism (last updated Apr. 28, 2014). 
14.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM xiii (2d ed. 2013) (“it was the Romantics
who introduced ideas of originality into the arts. The very idea of the artist as a creator,. . . is a Roman-
tic inheritance.”). 
15.  Jacqueline Rhodes, Copyright, Authorship, and the Professional Writer: The Case of William
Wordsworth, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY, available at 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/encap/journals/corvey/articles/cc08_n01.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
16.  Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 151, 165 (1998). 
17.  Id.
18.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM xiii (2d ed. 2013) (“we come to believe the
task of the artist was to bring something new into the world.”). 
19.  Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in
Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 193 (2008). 
20.  8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html; Doris Estelle
Long, Dissonant Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash N’ Carry” Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163, 
1167 (2007). 
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presented authors as owners, whose mental labor created intellectual works, and 
the intellectual works were presented as objects of property.21 Thus, Romanticism 
was combined with natural-rights theories in order to justify copyrights as property 
owned by the author.22 
When Great Britain began establishing colonies in North America, the mod-
ern view of authorship “crossed the pond” and became a central part of American 
copyright law. The original thirteen colonies enacted their own copyright laws 
based on the Statute of Anne.23 After America gained independence from Great 
Britain, copyright law remained a priority amongst the Framers. Therefore, at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, Charles C. Pinckney and James Madison both 
submitted proposals to give Congress the power to grant copyrights to authors.24 
The Framers of the Constitution subsequently drafted the Intellectual Proper-
ty Clause: “The Congress shall have Power. . .[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors. . . the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings.”25 Three years later, the Framers legislated the first Unit-
ed States copyright statute—the Copyright Act of 1790.26 The Copyright Act has 
been revised and amended several times over the years, but it still remains the 
primary statute for U.S. copyright law. 
B. The Standard of Original Authorship in Copyright Law 
The Copyright Act states, “Copyright protection subsists. . . in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”27 However, the Copy-
right Act does not indicate exactly what Congress meant by “original works of 
authorship.” According to the legislative history, the phrase “original works of 
authorship” was purposely left undefined for courts to interpret the standard and 
scope of original authorship.28 
21.  Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in
Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 194 (2008) 
22.  Id.
23.  See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 648 (1943) (“In this country
the copyright laws enacted by the original thirteen states prior to 1789 were based largely upon the 
Statute of Anne.”). 
24.  See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17
GEO. L.J. 109, 109 (1929). 
25.  U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26.  See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 427 (2004). 
27.  17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West) (emphasis added). 
28.  See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 58 (Vicki
Been et al. eds. 3d ed. 2010)(“According to the legislative history, ‘[t]he phrase “original works of 
authorship,” which is purposely left undefined, was intended to incorporate without change the standard 
of originality established by the courts. . .’”). 
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As a result, original authorship has been molded over several cases. A semi-
nal case for original authorship is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice Company, Inc.,29 where the U.S. Supreme Court said that originality is a 
constitutional requirement for authorship.30 The Court stated, “[o]riginal, as the 
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by 
the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possess at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.”31 The standard of creativity is an extremely 
low bar; even a slight amount will suffice.32 Thus, originality requires independent 
creation and a low level of creativity.33 
Although Feist provides a succinct standard, concepts of original authorship 
arose in much earlier cases. In Bleistein, v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,34 the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered the copyrightability of posters drawn from real-life 
circus performers.35 The Court found original authorship in the posters: 
[E]ven if [the posters] had been drawn from the life, that fact would not 
deprive them of protection. . . Others are free to copy the original [and 
natural scene]. They are not free to copy the [work]. . . The [work] is the 
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always con-
tains something unique. . . which is one man’s alone. That [is] something 
he may copyright. . .36 
The Court seemingly posits that the mere subjectivity of the author is enough 
for original authorship. A “personally unique” work is copyrightable because the 
author’s personal reaction to a natural scene is unique, or original, to the author.37 
This may seem like a low standard for original authorship,38 but the standard was 
29.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1991).
30.  Id. at 346. 
31.  Id. at 345. 
32.  Id.; see “Interestingly, Congress avoided making “creativity” an express element of copyright
when writing the 1976 statute; thus, the Feist creativity standard may be read as some variation that 
rises above the level of the trivial.” Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 
68 BROOK. L. REV. 123, 134 (2002). 
33.  “The U.S. Supreme Court has also made statements about what is not required for originality:
artistic merit, novelty, or any appreciable effort.” Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward A 
Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1512 (2011). 
34.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239(1903). 
35.  Id. at 248. 
36.  Id. at 250. 
37.  See id.
38.  The Court also established the non-discrimination principle, which warns judges to stay clear
of evaluating the artistic merit of works: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new lan-
guage in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of 
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the 
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge.” Id. at 251–52. One could argue this principle further lowers the standard of originality because 
it discourages judges from evaluating the artistic merit of works. 
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upheld and perpetuated (and maybe even lowered) in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda 
Fine Arts.39 
In Catalda Fine Arts, the Second Circuit considered whether mezzotint en-
gravings40 of oil paintings were copyrightable.41 The court held that even bad 
eyesight or unintentional mistakes provoke original authorship: 
But even if their substantial departures from the paintings were inadvert-
ent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective 
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield suffi-
ciently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation unin-
tentionally, the “author” may adopt it as his and copyright it.42 
Arguably, Catalda Fine Arts proposes that the creative requirement for origi-
nality is not creative at all. There is no conscience creativity in poor eyesight or 
mistakes, but the court in Catalda Fine Arts says such unintentional variations 
contribute to original authorship and are thus copyrightable.43 
This low standard embraces almost any work as original; whether the work is 
a trivial doodle on a bar napkin, a small child’s finger-painting, or a picture spon-
taneously snapped on a smartphone—all are likely deemed original under U.S. 
copyright law. The U.S. Supreme Court said in Feist that “[t]he vast majority of 
39.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
40. “The mezzotint engraving process is performed by first rocking a copper plate, that
is, drawing across the plate under pressure a hand tool having many fine and closely spaced 
teeth. The tool is drawn across the plate many times in various directions so that the plate is 
roughened by the process. The outlines of the engraving are then placed upon the plate either 
by tracing with carbon paper from a photograph of the original work which it is desired to re-
produce in this medium or by a tracing taken from such a photograph on gelatine sheets trans-
ferred to the copper plate by rubbing carbon black or some similar substance in the lines of 
the tracing on the gelatine sheet and transferring of them by pressing the sheet upon the cop-
per plate. With the image on the roughened plate the engraver then scrapes with a hand tool 
the picture upon the plate, obtaining light and shade effects by the depth of the scraping of the 
roughened plate or ground. When the plate is completed, trial prints are taken from it and it 
may be altered to make the final result to the satisfaction of the engraver. When it is complet-
ed and a satisfactory proof drawn from the plate, a thin steel coating is applied to it to pre-
serve it during the printing of the final article, of which several hundred may be drawn from 
such a steel-faced plate before noticeable wearing of the plate. The final product is a print in 
color called in the trade a proof. The color is applied to the plate by hand before each print or 
proof is drawn from the plate. The color may be applied to the plate by the artist, but usually 
is done by one or more printers who follow a sample print or color guide in applying the col-
ored ink in the depressions made by the engraver on the plate. It is possible by this process to 
make quite a satisfactory reproduction of the original painting in whatever size desired (the 
size of the photograph governing the size of the engraving), preserving the softness of line 
which is characteristic of the oil painting. It is not, however, possible to make a photographic 
copy of the painting by this method exact in all its details. 
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
41.  Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 104. 
42.  Id. at 105. 
43.  Id.
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works make the grade [of original authorship] quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”44 
Even so, there exists a threshold of when a work is unoriginal. In Meshwerks, 
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,45 the Tenth Circuit held that unadorned 
digital models of actual cars were unoriginal.46 The court reasoned the digital 
models had no creative attributes—they were simply unadorned digital replicas of 
real cars.47 Therefore, despite the extremely low standard for originality, there still 
remains a point at which an author’s work can be deemed unoriginal. 
Meshwerks also delved into the authorial intent of unoriginality, stating, “If 
an artist affirmatively sets out to be unoriginal—to make a copy of someone else’s 
creation, rather than to create an original work—it is far more likely that the result-
ant product will, in fact, be unoriginal. . .”48 Nevertheless, Meshwerks’s analysis 
still recognizes the low bar for originality: 
Of course, this is not to say that the accidental or spontaneous artist will 
be denied copyright protection for not intending to produce art; it is only 
to say that authorial intent sometimes can shed light on the question of 
whether a particular work qualifies as an independent creation or only a 
copy.49 
Thus, Meshwerks seems to follow the same low standard of originality—the 
“accidental or spontaneous” artist has grounds for copyrightability, despite not 
intending to produce art; that is, unintentional works satisfy the originality re-
quirement for copyrights. 
Comparably, cases involving the copyrights of photographs focused on the 
issue of original authorship. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,50 the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided whether a photograph was an original work of the 
author or the exact reproduction of a natural scene.51 The Court held the “photo-
graph to be an original work of art, the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, 
which plaintiff is the author.”52 The Court found originality in the photographer’s 
posing of the model, selecting and arranging of the costumes and accessories, 
44.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (U.S. 1991).; see also Catalda 
Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 103 (“No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be 
his own.”). 
45.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
46.  Id. at 1269 (“[W]e hold that Meshwerks’ digital, wire-frame models are insufficiently original
to warrant copyright protection. . .”). 
47.  Id. at 1266 (“To the extent that Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models depict only those
unadorned vehicles, having stripped away all lighting, angle, perspective, and “other ingredients” 
associated with an original expression, we conclude that they have left no copyrightable matter.”). 
48.  Id. at 1268. 
49.  Id. (emphasis added).
50.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
51.  Id. at 56. 
52.  Id. at 60. 
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arranging the light and shadows, and suggesting and evoking desired expres-
sions.53 Thus, the photograph is an original work of authorship because the photog-
rapher “directed” the natural scene. 
But is there original authorship in undirected photographs, or photographs 
where the photographer is passively snapping shots of the natural scene? Recently, 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.,54 determined there is more than one way a photo-
graph can be original.55 The district court of New York stated, “Almost any photo-
graph ‘may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright.’”56 The court 
then set forth three aspects of originality in photographs: (1) rendition, (2) timing, 
and (3) creation of the subject matter.57 
Originality by rendition refers to “such specialties as angle of shot, light and 
shade, exposure, effects achieved by means of filters, developing techniques etc.”58 
Originality through timing occurs when the photographer snaps the photograph “in 
the right place at the right time.”59 Lastly, “a photograph may be original to the 
extent that the photographer created ‘the scene or subject to be photographed.’”60 
These three points of originality for photographs are not mutually exclusive, and 
Mannion provides broad grounds for photographs to be original.61 Consequently, 
almost any photograph is an original work of authorship.62 
The cases mentioned above set a simple standard for originality: authors can-
not copy other works, and authors must input a modicum of creativity into their 
works63 (even if the creative input is unintentional64). Unsurprisingly, this standard 
reflects principles of Romanticism, including the Romantic author’s task to bring 
unique works into the world (independent creation) that emanate from the author’s 
mind (creativity).65 Moreover, the originality standard is low enough to include 
53.  Id.
54.  Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
55.  Id. at 452–54. 
56.  Id. at 450. 
57.  Id. at 452–54. 
58.  Id. at 452. 
59.  Id.
60.  Id.
61.  Id. at 450. 
62.  Id.
63.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (U.S. 1991)..
64.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). (“Having hit upon
such a variation unintentionally, the ‘author’ may adopt it as his and copyright it.”); Meshwerks, Inc. v. 
Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008). (“Of course, this is not to say 
that the accidental or spontaneous artist will be denied copyright protection for not intending to produce 
art. . .”). 
65.  See Blumenthal, supra note 16, at 165. 
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almost any work.66 Thus, U.S. copyright law allows anyone the potential to bear 
the illustrious title of “author.” 
II. MIND-MOVIES: THE NEUROTECHNOLOGY
A. Defining “Mind-Movie” 
“Mind-movie” is a term coined in this Article to describe any dynamic visual 
images read from, or extracted out of, the human brain; that is, visual stimuli, 
memories, or any other mental impressions of the natural world. This Article uses 
the term “mind-movie” broadly to incorporate current neurotechnology and any 
potential neurotechnology of the future67—including neurotechnology that 
measures more than the brain’s primary visual cortex.68 Obviously, it is impossible 
for anyone to predict how mind-movies will progress, but one can draw reasonable 
inferences based on the researchers’ goals and discussions.69 
66.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 103 (“No matter how poor
artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be his own.”). 
67.  This Article’s “mind-movie” definition incorporates potential neurotechnology of the future
because the analysis assumes researchers will make great advancements in the coming years, including 
better measurement procedures of the brain and clearer production of images. This assumption is loose-
ly based on “Moore’s Law,” which considers the rapid advancement of technology. See Ann C. Hodges 
& Porcher L. Taylor, III, The Business Fallout from the Rapid Obsolescence and Planned Obsolescence 
of High-Tech Products: Downsizing of Noncompetition Agreements, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 
27 (2005) (stating “[Moore’s Law] remains valid today, with the widely accepted understanding that 
computing power doubles on average “every eighteen months at the same price point.”). The assump-
tion of neurotechnology advancement may push this Article into highly abstract areas. Nonetheless, 
remember Justice Story’s quote: “[C]opyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging 
to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or 
at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.” Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt 
Mer. Mag. 175, 175 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
68.  See infra notes 88–89, 153–157 and accompanying text. 
69.  There are limitations to the current neurotechnology, including the reconstruction technology
that is explained in this Article. Nevertheless, “[r]econstruction is the most ambitious form of brain 
reading.” The Gallant Lab, supra note 5. When the technology is further developed, it may be possible 
to decode dreams, memory, and subjective mental imagery. “Neuroscientists generally assume that all 
mental processes have a concrete neurobiological basis. Under this assumption, as long as we have 
good measurements of brain activity and good computational models of the brain, it should be possible, 
in principle, to decode the visual content of mental processes like dreams, memory, and imagery. 
However, current computational models of visual processing have been developed to account for visual 
perception of natural scenes. The accuracy of these models for decoding subjective states such as 
dreaming and imagination will depend on how similar those processes are to normal visual perception. 
This is an active topic of research in our lab and in many other labs.” Id.; see Kendrick N. Kay et al., 
Identifying Natural Images From Human Brain Activity, 452 NATURE 352, 352 (2008) available at 
http://gallantlab.org/publications/2008a.Kay.etal.pdf (“For example, we could use the decoder to inves-
tigate differences in perception across people, to study covert mental processes such as attention, and 
perhaps even to access the visual content of purely mental phenomena such as dreams and imagery.”); 
Farahany, supra note 6, at 392 (“But this research, together with the emerging research in the neurosci-
ence of memories, demonstrates a convergence between neuroimaging and pattern recognition technol-
ogy. If pattern recognition and ‘reading’ from the visual cortex is possible, it may also be possible to do 
pattern reconstruction from the regions of the brain actively involved in memory recall.”). 
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B. The Mind vs. The Brain 
The neurotechnology for mind-movies is often referred to as “mind-reading” 
technology. Accordingly, a definition of “mind-reading” is required before a dis-
cussion about the neurotechnology. There is a distinction between the mind (con-
sciousness and thoughts) and the brain (the physical organ), known as the “mind-
body problem.”70 This distinction is important because if the mind equals the 
brain, then reading the actual physical brain is the same as mind-reading.71 
There is much debate over the mind-body problem in the philosophical com-
munity.72 Rene Descartes, the famous philosopher who coined the phrase “I think, 
therefore I am,” forwarded the position of “dualism,” which holds that the non-
material mind is completely different from the material brain.73 Conversely, other 
philosophers posit “materialism,” which holds there is nothing beyond the physical 
material of our brains—the mind is the brain.74 
Whichever position is taken can drastically change a discussion of mind-
reading technology. Therefore, this Article follows the computational theory of 
mind (“CToM”).75 CToM solves the mind-body problem by comparing the brain 
to a computer, and asserting that the mind is not the brain, but what the brain 
does.76 Steven Pinker describes CToM: 
[CToM] says that beliefs and desires are information, incarnated as con-
figurations of symbols. The symbols are the physical states of bits of 
matter, like chips in a computer or neurons in the brain. They symbolize 
things in the world because they are triggered by those things via our 
sense organs, and because of what they do once they are triggered. . . 
The computational theory of mind thus allows us to keep beliefs and de-
sires in our explanations of behavior while planting them squarely in the 
physical universe.77 
In other words, the mind “runs” on the brain like a program runs on a com-
puter. Thus, one can determine the program being run (the mind and thoughts) 
through the processes of the machine (the brain). 
CToM aligns nicely with the neurotechnology described in this Article, be-
cause researchers at UC Berkeley have been able to reconstruct the mind “pro-
gram” by measuring the activity of the “computer” brain. Professor Jack Gallant at 
UC Berkeley gave insight into how the current neurotechnology works: “We’re not 
70.  Shen, supra note 6, at 672. 
71.  Id.
72.  Id.
73.  René Descartes, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/descartes/. 
74.  Shen, supra note 6, at 672. 
75.  Id. at 673. 
76.  STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 24–25 (1997).
77.  Id. at 25. 
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really peering into your brain and reconstructing pictures in your head. We’re 
reading your brain activity and using that brain activity to reconstruct what you 
saw.”78 Thus, for purposes of this Article, “mind-reading” is capturing the brain’s 
visual experience by measuring the processes of the physical brain. 
C. Dr. Gallant’s Current Mind-Movie Neurotechnology 
Mind-reading has become a reality.79 Scientists all over the world are devis-
ing various methods to decode the human brain.80 However, one of the more im-
pressive methods came from Professor Jack Gallant and his colleagues at UC 
Berkeley who developed a process to discover mind-movies.81 
Dr. Gallant is striving towards a general mind-reading device that recon-
structs a movie of a person’s visual experience at any moment in time, and access-
es the visual content of purely mental phenomena such as dreams and imagery.82 
Dr. Gallant already broke unprecedented grounds in neuroscience by reconstruct-
ing a person’s brain activity to create a rough “movie” of the person’s visual expe-
riences.83 Dr. Gallant said, “You walk around the world,. . . [and] in some sense, 
you’re really just watching a movie of the world going by.”84 
78.  PBS News Hour, It’s Not Mind-Reading, but Scientists Exploring How Brains Perceive the
World, YOUTUBE (Jan. 2, 2012)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmD0gMxokDo&feature=player_embedded [hereinafter PBS]. 
79.  Mind-goggling, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 29, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21534748/ [hereinafter THE ECONOMIST]. Interestingly, Nikola Tesla 
tried to develop his own mind-reading technology in 1893. In Tesla’s words: “I expect to photograph 
thoughts. . . In 1893, while engaged in certain investigations, I became convinced that a definite image 
formed in thought, must by reflex action, produce a corresponding image on the retina, which might be 
read by a suitable apparatus. This brought me to my system of television which I announced at that 
time. . .” Bill Smallwood, Fun Fact Friday: Nikola Tesla, DISCOVERYEDUCATION.COM (Sept. 27, 
2013), https://blog.discoveryeducation.com/blog/2013/09/27/fun-fact-friday-nikola-tesla/. 
80.  Many other brain-reading methods exist but are not discussed in this article. For example,
Francisco Pereira and his colleagues at Princeton University determined what topics people were pon-
dering. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. Dr. Pereira measured people’s brain activity as they thought 
about certain objects. Dr. Pereira then used an algorithm to determine what type of object the person 
was thinking; for example, Dr. Pereira could say a person was thinking about a vegetable, but could not 
distinguish a carrot from a stick of celery. Id. Additionally, Martin Dresler, of the Max Planck Institute 
of Psychiatry in Munich, and his colleagues were able to identify actions performed in dreams. Id. Dr. 
Dresler recruited several lucid dreamers (people who can control their actions within a dream as if they 
were awake). Id. Dr. Dresler instructed the lucid dreamers to perform several actions within dream 
state. Once the lucid dreamers were asleep, Dr. Dresler recorded their brain activity. Dr. Dresler was 
able to distinguish the actions of people in dreams by their brain activity, which matched the same 
activity as if it were performed in reality. Id. This study was the first time science proved that the brain, 
when dreaming, behaves like the brain when awake. Id. 
81.  Kay, supra note 69. 
82.  See id.
83.  A video of the fMRI reconstruction is on YouTube. Jack Gallant, Movie Reconstruction From
Human Brain Activity, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsjDnYxJ0bo. 
84.  PBS, supra note 78. 
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Dr. Gallant devised a process that treats the brain like a camera—
automatically absorbing information through the retina and registering the imagery 
in the brain.85 First, Dr. Gallant placed an observer in a functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (“fMRI”) machine.86 An fMRI machine is a large device that 
“measures brain activity by detecting the associated changes of blood flow” in the 
brain.87 Dr. Gallant focused the fMRI machine on the observer’s primary visual 
cortex—the part of the brain used to process general shapes, textures, and move-
ment.88 The brain activity in the primary visual cortex is assumedly related to the 
particular visual stimulus that is being viewed at any point in time.89 
Accordingly, Dr. Gallant showed the observer scenes from film trailers while 
the computer recorded the fMRI brain activity from the observer’s primary visual 
cortex.90 Dr. Gallant and his colleagues compared the film trailers frame by frame 
with the fMRI brain activity, and looked for correlations between the two.91 Thus, 
the researchers matched each visual scene with the corresponding fMRI brain 
activity pattern. 
The researchers then fed the computer 5,000 hours of clips from YouTube,92 
and asked the computer to predict what the matching fMRI pattern would look like 
based on the correlations.93 Dr. Gallant said, “We want to essentially build a dic-
tionary that translates between things that happen in the world.”94 Therefore, the 
footage from YouTube would act as a “dictionary” to decode the brain activity and 
allow the computer to reconstruct the images.95 
Next, the observer re-entered the fMRI machine and watched a new set of 
film trailers,96 which the observer had never seen before.97 The computer looked at 
85.  Lisa Katayama, The Quest to Read the Human Mind, POPULAR SCIENCE (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-01/mind-readers. 
86.  Kay, supra note 69. 
87.  Ming Song & Tianzi Jiang, A Review of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for Brain-
netome, NEUROSCIENCE BULLETIN (June 2012), http://www.nlpr.ia.ac.cn/2012papers/gjkw/gk75.pdf. 
88.  PBS, supra note 78. 
89.  The Gallant Lab, supra note 5. 
90.  Kay, supra note 69, at 353. 
91.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. 
92.  YouTube is a video-sharing website, on which users can upload, view and share videos.
YouTube displays a wide variety of user-generated video content, including movie clips, TV clips, and 
music videos, as well as amateur content such as video blogging, short original videos, and educational 
videos. YouTube, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
93.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. 
94.  PBS, supra note 78. 
95.  Dr. Gallant’s use of YouTube brings about a whole set of copyright issues on its own. A
couple of issues are addressed in the footnotes of this Article, but most are outside the scope of the 
Article. 
96.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. 
97.  The Gallant Lab, supra note 5 (“we try to reconstruct the stimulus that a person saw while
they were being scanned, even if the stimulus is completely novel and has never been seen before. For 
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the observer’s new fMRI patterns and picked the YouTube clips whose corre-
sponding hypothetical fMRI pattern best matched the real one.98 The computer 
then “melded these clips together to produce an estimate of what the real clip 
looked like.”99 Thus, the computer reconstructed the fMRI brain activity to gener-
ate a rough movie of the observer’s visual experience.100 
Dr. Gallant’s process yields staggering results. The reconstructed fMRI activ-
ity produces recognizable images from the film trailers.101 Additionally, the recon-
structed images move in the same way as the film trailer, and contain similar 
colors.102 Such a breakthrough is novel in the neuroscience community. Dr. Gal-
lant said, “Everyone always thought it was impossible to recover dynamic brain 
activity with fMRI.”103 Benjamin Singer, an fMRI researcher at Princeton Univer-
sity, said “Usually you only get that kind of accuracy in physics, not neurosci-
ence. . . It’s a tour de force that brings together decades of work.”104 
Reconstructing the brain activity is a major step toward the ultimate goal of 
picturing subjective mental processes.105 Future advances in brain signal measure-
ment, development of more sophisticated encoding models, and better understand-
ing of the structure of natural images will eventually make this goal a reality.106 
Thus, one day, it should be possible to decode the visual content of mental pro-
cesses like dreams, memory, and imagery.107 
example, if someone watched a movie while in the scanner, we could try to recreate the movie that they 
were watching”). 
98.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. 
99.  Id.
 100.  Here is a brief hypothetical to summarize and illustrate Dr. Gallant’s process: Mr. Beck 
watches a single video of a blooming flower (“Video A”) while connected to an fMRI machine. The 
computer records Mr. Beck’s fMRI brain activity while he watches Video A, and associates Mr. Beck’s 
fMRI pattern with a blooming flower. The computer takes several other YouTube videos of blooming 
flowers and predicts the future fMRI patterns of Mr. Beck when he watches other blooming flowers. 
Thus, when Mr. Beck watches a completely new video containing a blooming flower (“Video B”), the 
computer recognizes Mr. Beck’s fMRI pattern, and knows the pattern is correlated to a blooming 
flower. Accordingly, the computer pulls all the YouTube clips of blooming flowers and melds them 
together to predict Mr. Beck’s visual experience of Video B. The final product is a mind-movie from 
Mr. Beck’s brain that presents the image of a blooming flower. 
 101.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 79. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Erica Westly, Brain Imaging Reveals What You’re Watching, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/425520/brain-imaging-reveals-what-youre-
watching/. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  The Gallant Lab, supra note 5. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id.; Interestingly, mind-movies fit nicely within the theory of Romantic authorship—content 
recorded or extracted directly from the author’s brain is the most personal and unique work the author 
can offer to society. 
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III. ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP IN MIND-MOVIES
It is uncertain how courts will rule on cases involving mind-movies. Assum-
ing mind-movies progress into clear depictions of visual experiences,108 federal 
judges may find difficulty in applying the doctrine of original authorship to works 
taken directly from the brain. Nevertheless, this Article argues that under case law 
precedent, mind-movies are original works of authorship in at least two ways: 
unique visual experiences and unique mental processes. 
A. Unique Visual Experiences 
This Article refers to “unique visual experiences” for the vantage point of a 
person viewing a natural scene, i.e., where a person stands, the angle at which they 
tilt their head, their visual eyesight, etc. These unique visual experiences likely 
produce originality for copyright purposes because the visual information con-
veyed to the primary visual cortex is unique and specific to each person. 
For example, a mind-movie will vary for each person due to differences in 
eyesight. The eyes are the brain’s “window to the world” and how the brain gath-
ers any visual information.109 Thus, a difference in eyesight automatically changes 
the visual information entering the primary visual cortex, ergo variations in mind-
movies. 
Originality for copyright purposes may lie in varied eyesight alone. In Catal-
da Fine Arts, the court explicitly pointed to “bad eyesight” as a variation worth 
original authorship: “A copyist’s bad eyesightFalse may yield sufficiently distin-
guishable variationsFalse [that] the ‘author’ may adopt it as his and copyright 
it.”110 Noticeably, the court was not referring to eyesight in terms of mind-movie 
neurotechnology.111 
However, the analysis of Catalda Fine Arts still applies. The court reasons 
that bad eyesight changes how the author produces the work; thus, providing a 
unique variation upon the work.112 Similarly, a person with poor vision will pro-
duce a completely different mind-movie than a person with 20/20 vision. The 
 108.  See supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text. 
 109.  Light enters the eye through an opening the center of the iris called the pupil. It is focused by 
the lens and cornea and projected onto the retina, the rear or the surface of the eye, which is lined with 
visual receptors. The receptors send their messages to bipolar cells, neurons located closed to the center 
of the eye. The bipolar cells send their messages to ganglion cells, located still closer to the center of the 
eye. The ganglion cells loop together and exit the eye to form the optic nerve. Visual stimuli travel 
through the optic nerve to the brain to be processed by the primary visual cortex. JAMES W. KALAT, 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 153–168 (9th ed. 2007). 
110.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).. 
111.  See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 112.  See Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 105. 
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person with 20/20 vision has the ability to capture more details of a natural scene 
for the brain to process, and provide explicit details in a mind-movie. Conversely, 
a person with poor vision cannot see certain details of the same natural scene. 
Thus, a person with poor vision will process completely different visual infor-
mation and produce distinguishable variations in his or her mind-movie. 
Under Catalda Fine Arts, the variations in mind-movies, produced from bad 
eyesight, are original to the author and can be copyrighted.113 Still, courts might be 
reluctant to look solely at the results of eye examinations or ocular proscriptions to 
determine the originality of mind-movies. Moreover, the argument is severely 
weakened if two people have 20/20 vision (or the same proscriptions)—objective 
evidence that the visual information entering the primary visual cortex is similar. 
Accordingly, courts can look to the photography cases to determine the origi-
nality of mind-movies. Dr. Gallant’s mind-movie process already considers the 
brain a biological camera;114 thus, original authorship as it applies to a mechanical 
camera is likely comparable. Burrow-Giles determined that a photograph flowed 
entirely from the photographer’s original mental conception, despite it capturing 
information from the natural world.115 Therefore, a mind-movie seems original 
because it captures the visual experiences of the brain—similar to a photograph. 
However, Burrow-Giles based originality on the photographer “directing” the 
captured scene. The photographer posed the model, arranged the lighting, and 
evoked the desired expressions in the photograph.116 This is different from a per-
son who is merely living life, observing natural scenes, and passively gathering 
visual information to the primary visual cortex. When a person visually experienc-
es a sporting event, a sunrise, or a shooting star, he or she is not directing, posing, 
arranging, or evoking anything in the scene. The person is merely “capturing” what 
is present, and not “directing” the scene. 
This “passive observer” arguably creates an unoriginal mind-movie. In 
Meshwerks, the designers created unadorned and accurate digital models of real 
cars, without adding any original expression.117 Thus, the court found the digital 
models to be unoriginal.118 Likewise, the passive observer is merely gathering 
visual information with accuracy, and he is not adding any creative attributes. 
Thus, the passive observer’s mind-movie is unoriginal. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Katayama, supra note 85 (“The visual cortex works like a camera, automatically absorbing 
information through the retina and registering the imagery in the brain.”). 
115.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).  
 116.  Id. 
117.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1269–70 (10th Cir. 
2008).. 
 118.  Id. at 1269. 
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Still, this argument fails on two grounds. First, a person cannot actually ob-
serve a natural scene with complete accuracy and produce an unoriginal mind-
movie. Such a feat is likely improbable, and maybe even impossible, given various 
studies on how people’s visual stimuli and memories can often be inaccurate.119 
These inaccuracies themselves make mind-movies original under Catalda Fine 
Arts’s reasoning for unintentional variations.120 Moreover, as will be discussed 
later in this Article, an observer’s subconscious mental processes automatically 
impose originality on visual information, despite the passive observer’s intent to 
create unoriginal mind-movies.121 
Second, the passive observer is probably more akin to Meshwerks’s “acci-
dental or spontaneous artist.” For example, an accidental or spontaneous artist may 
throw buckets of paint onto a canvas without any intention of creating a work. 
Nevertheless, Meshwerks holds the artist can still receive copyright protection in 
such a work, despite the artist not intending to produce art.122 
Similarly, the passive observer may not intend to produce art, but this does 
not prevent him from claiming the mind-movie as an original work of authorship. 
When the passive observer is viewing natural scenes, he essentially “throws” the 
paint of the world onto the canvas of his brain and creates an original work without 
any intention of creating art. The mind-movie is an extraction of that original work 
from the observer’s brain and is copyrightable whether the observer intends to 
create the work or not. 
Nonetheless, positing unique visual experiences as the basis for originality in 
mind-movies probably finds the strongest support from Mannion. In Mannion, the 
court forwarded rendition (angle of the shot) and timing (right place at the right 
time) as two ways photographs can be original to the author.123 Similarly, mind-
movies are original in terms of rendition and timing. 
A person observing a natural scene from various angles creates a unique vis-
ual experience in a mind-movie that satisfies originality by rendition. Where a 
person is standing, how a person holds their head, and even a person’s height, all 
 119.  See Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness 
Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1895 (2005) (“However, thirty years 
of psychological research into the workings of human memory have revealed that eyewitness accounts 
are frequently flawed, either because the witness’s original perception of the event was flawed, or 
because the memory was subconsciously altered prior to testifying at trial.”); see Fredric D. Woocher, 
Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identi-
fication, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 976 (1977) (“The inherent limitations of the human brain are the major 
source of inaccuracy in perception. People can perceive only a limited number of the simultaneous 
stimuli in the environment at any time. . .”). 
120.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 121.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 122.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1268. 
123.  Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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contribute to a unique visual perspective when gathering visual stimuli. For exam-
ple, Person-A watching a waterfall from the North will have a completely different 
visual experience from Person-B, who is watching the same waterfall from the 
West. The visual experiences vary further if Person-A is two feet taller than Per-
son-B. 
These differences in visual experiences are specifically attributable to Person-
A and Person-B, and thus original to each person. Mannion provides that such 
renditions, or angles, of visual experiences are original and copyrightable.124 
Therefore, mind-movies are original works of authorship based on rendition. 
Additionally, mind-movies are original in terms of timing. Mannion illus-
trates originality through timing by referencing Thomas Mangelsen’s photograph, 
Catch of the Day.125 Catch of the Day depicts a salmon jumping into the gaping 
mouth of a brown bear.126 Mr. Mangelsen is the only person who captured the 
photograph at that moment in time because nobody else was “standing in his 
shoes” and snapping the shutter at the exact time.127 Thus, the photograph is origi-
nal to Mr. Mangelsen in terms of timing.128 
Likewise, a mind-movie continually captures precise moments of a visual ex-
perience that is original to the individual who “captures” the visual stimuli. If a 
mind-movie were paused at any second, the image presented would be just as 
original in timing as Catch of the Day. No one else can be in the observer’s head 
and capture the observer’s visual experience at that moment in time. Consequently, 
mind-movies are original in terms of timing because the precise moments are per-
sonally unique to the individual gathering the visual stimuli.129 
Using the language of Bleistein and Catalda Fine Arts, a unique visual expe-
rience is a “personal reaction of [the] individual upon nature,”130 which creates 
 124.  Id. at 452. 
 125.  Id. at 453 (a digital image of the photograph Catch of the Day, MANGELSEN, available at 
http://mangelsen.com/out-of-print-images/catch-of-the-day-1698.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See Mannion, 377 F. Supp. at 452 (“in the right place at the right time”). 
 128.  Mannion also notes that “[c]opyright based on originality in timing is limited by the principle 
that copyright in a photograph ordinarily confers no rights over the subject matter. Thus, the copyright 
in Catch of the Day does not protect against subsequent photographs of bears feasting on salmon in the 
same location. Furthermore, if another photographer were sufficiently skilled and fortunate to capture a 
salmon at the precise moment that it appeared to enter a hungry bear’s mouth-and others have tried, 
with varying degrees of success - that photographer, even if inspired by Mangelsen, would not neces-
sarily have infringed his work because Mangelsen’s copyright does not extend to the natural world he 
captured.” Id. 
 129.  This does not prevent another person from standing in the same spot, watching the same 
scene, and claiming copyright in their own mind-movie. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Others are free to copy the original [and natural scene]. They are not free to 
copy the [work]. . .”). 
 130.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
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“sufficiently distinguishable variations.”131 Bleistein stated such personal reactions 
were copyrightable,132 and Catalda Fine Arts similarly determined distinguishable 
variations (whether intentional or unintentional) are copyrightable.133 Thus, unique 
visual experiences give mind-movies at least a scintilla of originality. 
B. Unique Mental Processes 
This Article uses the phrase “unique mental processes” to encapsulate the 
variations of mental perception, brain activity, and brain physiology. The unique 
mental processes of visual stimuli generate originality in mind-movies. Mental 
processes are different for each person; whether it is perception models based on 
personal experience or physical differences in the way each brain processes infor-
mation. Therefore, the human brain acts as a subjective “filter” for the visual in-
formation gathered and ultimately presented in mind-movies.134 
First, human perception likely generates originality in mind-movies.135 Per-
ception is an aspect of human behavior where each individual’s experience com-
bine in a complex fashion to determine his or her reaction to a given stimulus 
situation.136 Perception is based on internal “models” or representations of experi-
ences in the world.137 Robert V. Wells explains how these internal models apply to 
our everyday lives: 
131.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 132.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
 133.  Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 105. 
134.  Of course the current use of YouTube in Dr. Gallant’s process may conform some of the 
subjective differences in brains. Dr. Gallant’s process is limited by using a finite number of YouTube 
videos to reconstruct brain activity. Therefore, the same YouTube videos can be used to reconstruct 
brain activity from different people and lead to similar results. For example, Person-A and Person-B 
might watch the same blooming flower but pay attention to different aspects of the flower, or mentally 
perceive the flower in completely different ways; i.e., Person-A thinks the flower is blue and Person-B 
thinks the flower is purple. However, YouTube only has a video of a yellow flower blooming, and uses 
that video to reconstruct the different brain activity of Person-A and Person-B. Consequently, both 
mind-movies reach similar results despite specific differences in the subjective perceptions of Person-A 
and Person-B. Nevertheless, this Article defined “mind-movies” to incorporate future neurotechnology. 
Accordingly, this Article assumes the neurotechnology will inevitably reach the point of accuracy to 
convey the purely subjective differences of brain processes in mind-movies. 
 135.  Human perception happens beyond the primary visual cortex. See I KNOW WHAT YOU’RE 
THINKING: BRAIN IMAGING AND MENTAL PRIVACY 61 (Sarah Richmond et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
BRAIN IMAGING] (“The relationship between brain structure and visual perception extend outside 
sensory cortex in the occipital lobe of the human brain to encompass other areas.”). Still, this Article’s 
definition of “mind movie” incorporates future neurotechnology that measures the brain beyond the 
primary visual cortex. See Id. 
136.  Marshall H. Segall et al., The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception, in SOCIAL 
PERCEPTION 5 (Hans Toch & Clay Smith eds., 1968), 
http://bin.sc/Collection/Net/allanmc/web/socialperception14.pdf. 
 137.  Robert V. Wells, The Nature of Meaning: The Role of the Trial Lawyer in Creating and 
Shaping Meaning, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 297, 300 (2008). 
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As we go through life, we develop models based on our unique back-
grounds, and these meaning models mediate our perception and interpre-
tation of new experiences. Each person’s meaning models will 
necessarily differ from the meaning models of others, due to their unique 
backgrounds and experiences. Thus, we all perceive reality in a different 
way. In this respect, we all live in relatively different worlds.138 
Consequently, internal models cause people to perceive different details 
when observing the same natural scene.139 Going back to the hypothetical of Per-
son-A and Person-B watching the same waterfall,140 the mind-movies of each 
person can differ in terms of perception. Assuming Person-A has personal experi-
ence in bird-watching,141 Person-A’s mind-movie might incorporate the species of 
birds flying over the waterfall because Person-A is more prone to perceiving birds 
in the natural scene (even if done subconsciously). 
On the other hand, Person-B may not be prone to gathering the information 
about the birds because he does not bird-watch or have any experience with birds. 
Instead, Person-B could be a botanist142 and subconsciously notice the vegetation 
around the waterfall. Thus, Person-B’s mind-movie might incorporate details about 
the surrounding vegetation. Accordingly, the visual experiences differ between 
Person-A and Person-B, despite both observing the same natural scene. 
Although this example is simplistic, it illustrates how perception varies from 
person to person. Other examples of perceptual differences are when people see 
conflicting images in optical illusions,143 or variances in eyewitness testimony for 
criminal cases.144 Each person’s perception skews the objective natural scene to 
become a subjective and unique visual experience.145 
 138.  Id. at 315. 
 139.  “Of all the stimuli striking your retina at any moment, you attend to only a few. A stimulus 
can grab your attention by its size, brightness, or movement, but you can also voluntarily direct your 
attention to one stimulus or another in what is called a ‘top-down’ process.” KALAT, supra note 109, at 
181. “People can perceive only a limited number of the simultaneous stimuli in the environment at any 
time. . . In order to cope with these innate limitations, an observer develops unconscious strategies to 
aid in the selectivity of perceptual processes and ultimately to concentrate attention on the most neces-
sary and useful details.” Woocher, supra note 119. 
 140.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
141.  “Bird-watching” is the observation of birds as a recreational activity. Birdwatching, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birdwatching (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
 142.  A botanist is a person who studies plants and other vegetation. See Botanist, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botanist (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
 143.  See BRAIN IMAGING, supra note 135 (“Vision scientists have long been fascinated by visual 
stimuli whose perceptual interpretation is ambiguous (for example, the Necker cube is a picture of a 
wire frame cube whose perspective interpretation is ambiguous between a cube who front fact point 
down and to the left and one that points up and to the right). In such situations, perception alternates 
spontaneously between different possible interpretations. . .”). 
 144.  See Woocher, supra note 119. 
 145.  “Our ability to accurately perceive reality and to create accurate representational models is 
limited by our unique personal history, which affects how we perceive reality.” Wells, supra note 137, 
at 314. 
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As a result, perception yields originality in mind-movies. Bleistein found an 
author’s drawing as a personal reaction upon nature that was unique, or original, to 
the author and copyrightable.146 Similarly, a person’s perception of visual infor-
mation is a personal reaction upon a natural scene that is original. No two people 
have the exact same internal models or past experiences to perceive a natural scene 
in the same way.147 Moreover, perception adds sufficiently distinguishable varia-
tions to the visual information that a person may adopt as his or her own (even if 
the observer unintentionally creates the variations).148 Thus, perceptual variations 
lead to originality in mind-movies. 
Another unique mental process that gives mind-movies sufficient originality 
is the physiological differences in human brains. “Everyone’s brain is a little bit 
different,” says Jim Haxby, a neuroscientist who led the first brain decoding study 
in 2001.149 These physical differences in brains can actually cause distinguishable 
variations in visual information. 
Geraint Rees and Ryota Kanai give examples of how differences in brain 
physiology cause variances in visual information: 
One consequence of variability in human visual cortex anatomy is that 
individuals who have a larger surface area of primary visual cortex also 
have a greater ability to discriminate fine visual detail. But variability in 
surface area of primary visual cortex also has consequences for the ap-
pearance of objects. For example, the perceived size of objects is corre-
lated with the surface area of the primary visual cortex. As primary 
visual cortex increases in surface area, the perceived size of visual ob-
jects decreases. . .[T]hese studies establish not only that there is consid-
erable inter-individual variability in how we perceive key attributes of 
the visual environment, but that such variability in perception can in 
principle be predicted from measurements of the surface area of primary 
visual cortex.150 
This variability of the visual environment fosters originality in mind-movies. 
Similar to perception, a person’s brain physiology skews the objective natural 
scene to create a subjective and unique visual experience. The visual experience 
presented in mind-movies is unique to each person because everyone’s brains are 
physiologically different and process visual information differently.151A person’s 
146.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
 147.  Wells, supra note 137, at 315. 
 148.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 149.  Kerry Smith, Reading Minds, 502 NATURE 428, 430 (2013), 
http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.13989!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/502428a.pdf. 
“Devising a decoding model that can generalize across brains, and even for the same brain across time, 
is a complex problem. Decoders are generally built on individual brains, unless they’re computing 
something relatively simple. . .” Id. 
 150.  BRAIN IMAGING, supra note 135, at 60. 
 151.  See NAOMI GOLDBLUM, THE BRAIN-SHAPED MIND: WHAT THE BRAIN CAN TELL US ABOUT 
THE MIND 18 (2001) (“[P]eople’s brains [are] different, just as everyone has different fingerprints from 
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unique skew on a natural scene creates sufficiently distinguishable variations152 
that the person may adopt as his own in mind-movies. Thus, mind-movies pass the 
low bar of originality due to unique mental processes. 
Setting aside this Article’s forward-looking definition for mind-movies,153 
Dr. Gallant’s current process presents a specific issue, which may challenge the 
creative requirement of originality for future neurotechnology.154 Originality re-
quires a modicum of creativity,155 but creativity must be present nonetheless. Dr. 
Gallant’s process measures the fMRI brain activity from the brain’s primary visual 
cortex.156 The primary visual cortex is in the occipital lobe; where visual infor-
mation is initially gathered and processed before reaching other parts of the 
brain.157 However, creative thought is largely associated with the frontal lobes of 
the brain.158 Therefore, can a mind-movie be original if it is taken only from the 
primary visual cortex; i.e., the “non-creative” part of the brain?159 
The answer is likely found in Catalda Fine Arts and Meshwerks. In Catalda 
Fine Arts, the court determined an author’s bad eyesight or defective musculature 
everyone else”); see THE PRAEGER HANDBOOK OF LEARNING AND THE BRAIN 149 (Sheryl Feinstein 
ed., 2006) (“Individual. . . differences contribute to the fact that everyone’s brain is different”); see THE 
DANA GUIDE TO BRAIN HEALTH 11 (edited by Floyd Bloom et el. eds., 2003) (“Everyone undergoes 
different experiences, and everyone’s brain develops differently”). 
 152.  See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 153.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 154.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 155.  See supra notes 32, 44 and accompanying text. 
 156.  PBS, supra note 78. 
 157.  See KALAT, supra note 109; BRYAN KOLB & IAN Q. WHISHAW, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 373 (6th ed., 2009) (“The function of the occipital lobe is vision.”); DAVID 
HUBEL, The Primary Visual Cortex, in EYE, BRAIN, AND VISION 3 (1995) available at 
http://hubel.med.harvard.edu/book/ch4.pdf (“fibers leave the primary visual cortex and project to 
several other cortical regions”). 
 158.  See Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash N’ Carry” Creativi-
ty, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163, 1178 (2007) (“Creativity has been variously associated with frontal lobe 
activity.”); CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 117 (James 
C. Kaufman & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2010) (“The frontal lobes and the right hemisphere are most 
centrally engaged during creative thought and problem solving. . . the prefrontal cortex—are what make 
our species unique. They form the seat of the higher reaches of human nature, namely, consciousness, 
creativity, personality, and morality.”); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 735, 749 (2013) (“The cognitive architecture produces the constellation of neural nodes 
that yields creativity by engaging in what neuroscientists call divergent and convergent neural process-
es. When facing a problem requiring creative thought, the brain first seeks easy answers, concentrating 
on obvious facts and familiar solutions. This is mostly a left hemisphere function. If that process fails, 
the left hemisphere begins working in tandem with the right hemisphere, which engages in what is 
called divergent thinking, scanning through nodes accessible to the neural network and searching for 
patterns and associations that may be relevant to the problem.”). 
 159.  The primary visual cortex does transform the visual information received. See HUBEL, supra 
note 157 (“the primary visual cortex does exert profound transformations on the information it re-
ceives.”). These transformations are likely original. See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text. 
Nevertheless, courts may wrestle with the unusual idea of an original work taken from the non-creative 
part of the brain. 
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might yield sufficiently distinguishable variations to a work.160 The author may 
adopt these variations as his own161—that is, the variations are original to the au-
thor—even if the variations were unintentional.162 
However, there is no conscious creativity in an author’s bad eyesight or de-
fective musculature. These are merely practical characteristics of an author that 
produce variations in a work. Nevertheless, the court determines such characteris-
tics can lead to unintentional variations that are copyrightable.163 
Similarly, mind-movies contain sufficiently distinguishable variations that 
are original to the author and copyrightable, despite being taken from a “non-
creative” part of the author’s brain. Although creative thought is not associated 
with the primary visual cortex,164 there are distinguishable variations in mind-
movies due to unique visual experiences,165 and physiological differences in the 
primary visual cortex.166 These variations are unintentional, but such unintentional 
variations are covered under Catalda Fine Arts.167 Thus, the bar of originality is 
low enough to incorporate works that may not be the direct product of conscience 
creativity. 
Meshwerks further supports this notion. Meshwerks presents the road to uno-
riginality as a one-way street: the person who intentionally seeks to be unoriginal 
is more likely to produce an unoriginal work; conversely, the person who is not 
intending to produce any kind of work can still claim copyright protection.168 The 
court explicitly states the “accidental or spontaneous artist” can still be afforded 
“copyright protection for not intending to produce art.”169 
By highlighting the accidental or spontaneous artist, the court leaves the door 
open for works to be original despite the author’s lack of conscious creativity. 
There is no conscience creativity in a work that is “accidental” or “spontaneous” 
(terms synonymous with “unthinking”170). Arguably, the artist who randomly 
throws paint onto a canvas is not exhibiting the same conscious creativity, or mak-
ing the same creative choices as Picasso (especially if the artist is not intending to 
160.  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See supra notes 157–158. 
 165.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 166.  See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d at 105 (“Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, 
the ‘author’ may adopt it as his and copyright it.”). 
168.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008).. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  APPLE DICTIONARY (Version 2.1.3, 2009) (search “accidental” and “spontaneous” in Thesau-
rus). 
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produce a work at all). Nevertheless, the low standard of originality affords both 
artists copyright protection for their respective works. 
Accordingly, mind-movies taken from the “non-creative” part of the brain are 
likely original. If the bar for originality is low enough to include works from the 
“accidental or spontaneous author,” then a mind-movie with sufficiently distin-
guishable variations is probably original, despite being taken from the “non-
creative” part of the brain. Therefore, mind-movies meet the low bar of originality, 
despite the lack of conscious creativity. 
Unique mental processes alter the visual experiences of everybody. Each per-
son can claim his or her unique mental process as their own, which leads to origi-
nality in mind-movies. The standard of originality is low enough to include mind-
movies as original works of authorship, even if mind-movies are recorded from an 
area of the brain not associated with creative thought. Thus, mind-movies are suf-
ficiently original due to unique mental processes. 
CONCLUSION 
The world is entering a new age of mind-reading neurotechnology. As a re-
sult, judges and courts will inevitably be faced with the novel issues associated 
with mind-reading, including the copyrightability of content taken directly from 
the brain. Nonetheless, the doctrine of original authorship sets the bar low enough 
to include almost any work. Thus, mind-movies satisfy the originality standard 
based on the author’s unique visual experiences and unique mental processes. 
Originality for mind-movies harkens back to the Romantic author—the pre-
cursor to copyright’s original author—because content taken directly from the 
author’s brain, is the most unique and personal work the author can offer to socie-
ty. The mind-movie gives society a glimpse of the author’s soul, and the author’s 
experiences and perceptions of life. Therefore, the mind-movie is the truest work 
of Romantic and original authorship. 
